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Phil Lord

Moral Panic and the War on Drugs
20 U.N.H. L. Rev. 407 (2022)

This Article analyzes the War on Drugs as a social phenomenon. It argues that such
an analysis, which rejects the assumption that collective, institutionalized behavior is generally
rational, can help us understand key aspects of why we continue to marginalize disadvantaged
individuals. If the War on Drugs is a war and wars are won or lost, there is no question we lost.
Whatever drug-related evil that war sought to eradicate, whether drug consumption, trafficking,
or addiction, the data clearly shows that “drugs won.” Along the way, we nonetheless persisted –
and largely still do. We filled prisons, lost lives, and shattered hopes and dreams. Those we hurt
the most were already marginalized. To state that we lost is unhelpful and insufficient. Of course,
we did. And we can draw obvious lessons that medicine and psychology work better than carceral
institutions and that no one benefits from marginalizing already marginalized and often sick
individuals. If the War on Drugs never worked, more salient questions are to be asked about why
we fought it. This Article posits that the War on Drugs is not about drugs, crime, or addiction: it
is about us. It is about why we cede to fear, anxiety, and irrationality. It is about why we
stigmatize and hurt the most vulnerable. Like other irrational and counterproductive policies, the
War on Drugs is not an anomaly. It bears close resemblance to other wars we fought (and fight)
against the disempowered: witches, gays, Muslims, and others.
ABSTRACT.
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MORAL PANIC AND THE WAR ON DRUGS

INTRODUCTION

People do weird things.
At times, they behave irrationally and
counterproductively – against their own best interest. They get driven by fear,
anger, or anxiety. They hurt themselves, and they hurt others. In other words, they
are human.
As an example, millennials shun romantic commitment significantly more than
their parents and grandparents.1 They fear the vulnerability and risk inherent to
long-term relationships, and this fear outweighs the potential benefits of such
relationships. 2 That is both irrational and counterproductive. Research
consistently shows that romantic and other close relationships are key to living a
happy and fulfilling life. The benefits of these relationships significantly outweigh
the risks they involve and pain they can cause.3
The behavior of millennials can teach us something important about the human
experience. We would never think of their behavior as rational or productive. We
know it is not. Neither would we be satisfied with noticing that their behavior is
counterproductive. That would not help much. Instead, we are interested in why
millennials act this way, in what their behavior tells us about contemporary society
and the human experience.4 This interest is important in itself, and it is also key to
understanding how behavior can change.
Somehow, though, we ascribe far more faith and many fewer flaws to our
behavior as groups. We quickly assume that institutions such as legal systems and
governments transcend our humanity and embody a level of rationality and
objectivity that eludes individuals. This assumption is unsettled by fact and
common sense. Legislative enactments and legal systems are not substantially
different from the individuals who shape and constitute them. Or, at the very least,
they are neither fully rational nor objective. Laws and policies are, at times,
underlain by shared fear, anger, and anxiety. When they are, they fail to meet their
stated purpose – and are often counterproductive.
Irrational and
counterproductive laws are not an anomaly. They are a natural and inevitable
product of imperfect, human-made systems.
If the War on Drugs is a war and wars are won or lost, there is no question we
1

See Louisa Scheling & David Richter, Generation Y: Do Millennials Need a Partner to be Happy?,
90 J. Adolescence 23, 23 (2021). See generally Varda Konstam, The Romantic Lives of
Emerging Adults: Getting from I to We (Oxford, 2019).

2

See Scheling & Richter, supra note 1, at 27. See generally Konstam, supra note 1.

3

See Jessica Kansky, What’s Love Got to Do With It?: Romantic Relationships and Well-Being, in
Handbook of Well-Being 619, 619 (Ed Diener, Shigehiro Oishi & Louis Tay, eds., 2018).

4

See Scheling & Richter, supra note 1, at 27. See generally Konstam, supra note 1.
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lost. Whatever drug-related evil that war sought to eradicate, whether drug
consumption, trafficking, or addiction, the data clearly shows that “drugs won.”5
Along the way, we nonetheless persisted – and often still do. We filled prisons, lost
lives, and shattered hopes and dreams. 6 Those we hurt the most were already
marginalized.7 To state that we lost is unhelpful and insufficient. Of course, we
did. And we can draw obvious lessons that medicine and psychology work better
than carceral institutions, and that no one benefits from marginalizing already
marginalized and often sick individuals.
If the War on Drugs never worked, more salient questions are to be asked about
why we fought it. This Article posits that the War on Drugs is not about drugs,
crime, or addiction: it is about us. It is about why we cede to fear, anxiety, and
irrationality. It is about why we stigmatize and hurt the most vulnerable. Like other
irrational and counterproductive policies, the War on Drugs is not an anomaly. It
bears close resemblance to other wars we fought (and fight) against the
disempowered: witches, gays, and Muslims. If we are to ever tame our irrational
impulses, we must first acknowledge them.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides general background on the
War on Drugs and its impact. Part II defines the central concept of moral panic.
Part III situates the War on Drugs as an instance of moral panic. It draws analogies
to prior moral panics. Arguing that moral panics are inherently rhetorical and
constitutive events, it also draws significantly upon a speech by then-First Lady of
the United States Hillary Rodham Clinton.
I.

THE WAR ON DRUGS

In the 1970s, the Nixon administration developed a conviction that drugs had
become a significant problem. That problem had to be addressed with public law,
using the strongest tools in the arsenal, and to their fullest extent. The offensive
would target the production, distribution, and consumption of these substances. A
Washington Post journalist describes the War on Drugs’ onset as follows:
As declarations of war go, it was pretty low key. On June 17, 1971, President Richard M.
Mark William Osler, What We Got Wrong in the War on Drugs, St. Thomas L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2) (preprint online); see infra Part I.

5

6

See infra Part I; see also Osler, supra note 5, at 2.

7

See infra Part I. See generally Julian Buchanan & Lee Young, The War on Drugs – A War on Drug
Users?, 7 Drugs: Educ., Prevention & Pol’y 409 (2000); Lisa D. Moore & Amy Elkavitch, Who’s
Using and Who’s Doing Time: Incarceration, the War on Drugs, and Public Health, 98 Am. J. Pub. Health
782 (2008); Doris Marie Provine, Race and Inequality in the War on Drugs, 7 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci.
41 (2011).
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Nixon held a news briefing in the West Wing of the White House. In his usual dark suit
and striped tie, speaking comfortably from notes, the president branded Americans’
rising tide of drug abuse “public enemy number one.” He continued: “In order to fight
and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive. . . . This will be a
worldwide offensive. . . . It will be government-wide . . . and it will be nationwide.” To
fund this new war, Nixon declared, he would ask Congress to appropriate a minimum
of $350 million. (In 1969, when Nixon first took the oath of office, the nation’s entire
federal drug budget was just $81 million.)8

As drugs became more popular, especially with younger Americans, over 80
percent of Americans also developed a conviction that even possession of lower-level
drugs should be criminalized.9 Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970,10 which rescheduled certain (“harder”) drugs.
Just over a decade later, as the offensive intensified, Congress passed the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, 11 which introduced mandatory minimum criminal sentences
(including for lower-level drugs) and generally targeted drug dealers.
The War on Drugs – in a way typical of moral panics, as defined in the next Part
– exemplifies a social consensus that drugs were a threat and that the threat had to
be addressed through public law. It is a product of several presidential
administrations and congresses, made up of politicians from across the political
spectrum. The same Washington Post journalist emphasizes this point by quoting
President Joe Biden:
Two years later, then-Sen. Joe Biden (D-Del.) tore into the George H.W. Bush
administration, declaring, “We need another D-Day. Instead, you’re giving us another
Vietnam: a limited war, fought on the cheap, financed on the sly, with no clear
objectives, and ultimately destined for stalemate and human tragedy.” Mainstream
politicians vied with one another to be seen as the toughest of the drug warriors. Harsh
drug laws did not end with Reagan. Both Bush and Bill Clinton further escalated the
War on Drugs, passing federal laws that increased imprisonment and provided massive
resources for local and state enforcement.12

The key aspect of the War on Drugs is, of course, that it hasn’t worked. That is

David Farber, The War on Drugs Turns 50 Today. It’s Time to Make Peace., Wash. Post.
(June 17, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/06/17/war-drugsturns-50-today-its-time-make-peace/ [https://perma.cc/A9UF-M8ZQ].

8

9

See id.

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–513, 84 Stat.
1236.

10

11

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.

12

Farber, supra note 8.
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especially true of the criminalization of drug possession. 13 Although the United
States is estimated to have spent over one trillion dollars on this effort,14 it has failed
to affect any drug-related outcome – whether drug consumption, trafficking, or
addiction. Between 1980 and 2019, while the number of arrests in the United States
remained roughly the same, the number of arrests on the basis of drug-related
charges almost tripled.15 Of the estimated drug-related 1,155,610 arrests in 2020,
86.7% were for possession of a controlled substance, and only 13.3% were for the sale
or manufacture of a controlled substance.16 In spite of the rhetoric of successive

See Desmond Manderson, Possessed: Drug Policy, Witchcraft and Belief, 19 Cultural Stud. 36,
38 (2005) [hereinafter Manderson, Possessed]; James C. Weissman, Drug Control Principles:
Instrumentalism and Symbolism, 11 J. Psychedelic Drugs 203, 203 (1979). Regarding this data, I have
noted: “Statistics … suggest that the criminalisation of possession for personal consumption of all
types of drugs does not decrease consumption rates, leads to the overincarceration of certain
marginalised groups, and may even indirectly cause an increase in crime rates. In contrast,
decriminalisation does not appear to cause an increase in consumption rates. Where it has been
enacted, mortality rates related to drug consumption and drug use by vulnerable segments of the
population (such as teenagers) have decreased,” Phil Lord, "It Doesn’t Work!": The Symbolic Aspect of
Law, From the Criminal Law to Bill 21, 9 Directions 1, 8 (2020). See generally Brian Stauffer, Every 25
Seconds: The Human Toll of Criminalizing Drug Use in the United States, Human Rights Watch (Oct.
12, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/10/12/every-25-seconds/human-toll-criminalizingdrug-use-united-states [https://perma.cc/4HGC-9HM8] (a recent, detailed report which catalogs
the relevant data).

13

See Farber, supra note 8; Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and
Counting: The Continued Failure of the War on Drugs, 811 Policy Analysis 1, 2–3 (2017)
(which also estimates that “[s]pending on the war continues to cost U.S. taxpayers more than $51
billion annually.”).

14

See Federal Bureau of Investigation Unif. Crime Reporting Program, Total Annual
Arrests in the US by Year and Type of Offense, Drug Policy Facts [hereinafter FBI, Total Annual
Arrests], https://www.drugpolicyfacts.org/chapter/crime_arrests#overlay=table/total_arrests
[https://perma.cc/D9EU-E8W7]. In 1980, 580,900 individuals (out of 10,441,000 arrests) were
arrested on drug-related charges. Id. In 2019, 1,558,862 individuals (out of 10,085,207 arrests)
were arrested on drug-related charges. Id.

15

See Federal Bureau of Investigation Unif. Crime Reporting Program, Total Annual
Drug Arrests in The United States by Offense Type, Drug Policy Facts,
https://www.drugpolicyfacts.org/chapter/crime_arrests# [https://perma.cc/R3N8-6RLG]; see also
FBI, Total Annual Arrests, supra note 15; Pew Charitable Trs., More Imprisonment Does Not
Reduce State Drug Problems: Data Show No Relationship Between Prison Terms and
Drug Misuse 2 (Mar. 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/03/pspp_more_
imprisonment_does_not_reduce_state_drug_problems.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP5U-2P2P],
which also notes: “[N]early half of those sentenced for federal drug crimes in 2009 were lowerlevel actors, such as street dealers, couriers, and mules. Research indicates that the public safety

16
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governments, neither the legislative enactments nor their enforcement appear to
have targeted harder drugs or drug trafficking. Instead, the data suggests that use,
possession, and trafficking of all types of drugs was criminalized (and targeted).17
As a result, the War on Drugs disproportionately criminalized those who engage in
more common activities, such as the use of lower-level drugs.18
Unsurprisingly, deterrence does not seem to work for drug use. 19 In other
words, criminalization reduces neither drug use nor related issues, such as
addiction and overdose deaths. 20 (In fact, more recently, drug use and the
impact of incapacitating these offenders is essentially nullified because they are rapidly replaced.”
Id. at 2.
17

See sources cited supra note 16.

18

See id.

See Pew Charitable Trs., supra note 16; see also Stauffer, supra note 13; Lord, supra note 13, at
8. Deterrence is a significant objective in the criminal law, see infra Part II.

19

See Pew Charitable Trs., supra note 16. The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan
organization. It finds no statistically significant relationship between these factors (on the one
hand, criminalization; on the other, drug use, drug overdose deaths, and drug arrests), even when
controlling for inter-state differences in population makeup (through factors such as race,
unemployment, education, and income). See id. at 1, 5. The report adds illustrative examples: “For
instance, Tennessee imprisons drug offenders at more than three times the rate of New Jersey,
but the states’ rates of self-reported drug use are virtually the same. Conversely, Indiana and Iowa
have nearly identical rates of drug imprisonment, but Indiana ranks 27th among states in selfreported drug use and 18th in overdose deaths compared with 44th and 47th, respectively, for
Iowa.” Id. at 5. The report also notes that recidivism has not decreased over the same period. See
id. at 2. The National Research Council has collected strong evidence that mandatory minimum
sentences, a significant aspect of the strategy of successive governments in the War on Drugs,
have virtually no deterrent effects on drug-related criminality. See Nat’l Research Council,
The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequence
347, 347 (The National Academies Press, 2014); see also Letter from Eric H. Holder Jr., Att’y Gen.,
U.S., to U.S. Attorneys and Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Criminal Division (Aug. 12, 2013),
https://www.justive.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-departmentpolicypon-charging-mandatroy-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certaindrugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMD9-H5W5] (“mandatory minimum and recidivist
enhancement statutes have resulted in unduly harsh sentences and perceived or actual disparities
that do not reflect our Principles of Federal Prosecution” … “Long sentences for low-level, nonviolent drug offenses do not promote public safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation.”). On the other
hand, significant federal and state reform reducing (or commuting) sentences for drug-related
offenses did not cause an increase in criminality or recidivism. See id. at 6–7. As an example, the
report notes: “In 2007, the Sentencing Commission retroactively cut the sentences of thousands
of crack cocaine offenders, and a seven-year follow-up study found no increase in recidivism
among offenders whose sentences were shortened compared with those whose were not. In 2010,
Congress followed the commission’s actions with a broader statutory decrease in penalties for

20
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availability of certain harder drugs has increased.)21 If there were ever some people
who elected to refrain from engaging in criminal activity out of fear of
incarceration, they would likely be those who can choose to refrain from engaging in
these activities, such as drug dealers. In contrast, individuals whose use of drugs is
criminalized are often, and by definition, addicted. They cannot freely respond to
incentives.22 Much can be said regarding the shift in public opinion regarding the
criminalization of drug use. As noted, when the War on Drugs was first proposed,
public opinion strongly supported the criminalization of possession of nominal
quantities of lower-level drugs.23 In contrast, most people now take it as a given that
those struggling with a drug addiction are a threat to themselves, not others, and
should be offered treatment, not punished.24

crack cocaine offenders.” Id. at 6; see also Stauffer, supra note 13 (“In 2001, Portugal decriminalized
the acquisition, use, and possession of illicit drugs in quantities up to a 10-day supply. …
According to a 2010 evaluation, rates of overall use in the population have stayed low—below the
European average, and far lower than rates in the United States—while use by adolescents and
use by people deemed to be drug dependent or who inject has declined. … The number of people
receiving drug treatment jumped by more than 60 percent after decriminalization. …
Decriminalization has also not triggered so-called “drug tourism,” a 2009 UN study found.”).
Other, more partisan sources have noted that the War on Drugs is closely related to the spread of
certain diseases and to violent crimes, including homicides. See Coyne & Hall, supra note 14, at
7–8. U.S. efforts aimed at curbing the supply of drugs from foreign countries have also largely
failed. See id. at 14–15 (“The Department of Defense, for example, more than tripled its operating
budget for counter-narcotics in Afghanistan from $72 million in 2004 to $225 million in 2005. …
Counter-drug policies in Afghanistan have not curtailed the drug market domestically and have
been counterproductive to other U.S. policy goals. In fact, cultivation of opium poppy nearly
tripled between 2002 and 2013, from 76,000 hectares in 2002 to a record 209,000 hectares.
According to the United Nations, Afghanistan now produces some 80 percent of the world’s illicit
opium.”).
See Pew Charitable Trs., supra note 16, at 2 (“self-reported use of illegal drugs increased
between 1990 and 2014, as has the availability of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine as
indicated by falling prices and a rise in purity” [references omitted]).

21

Some have noted that low-level drug dealers have very low incomes, see Stephen J. Dubner
& Steven Levitt, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of
Everything 79–105 (HarperCollins, 2009). We could therefore also question the assumption that
most drug dealers respond to incentives. See generally Richard H. Thaler and Cass R.
Sunstein, Nudge: The Final Edition (Penguin, 2021).

22

See Farber, supra note 8 (“Already in 1969, 84 percent of Americans said anyone caught with
even the smallest amount of marijuana should go to prison.”).

23

See Pew Charitable Trs., supra note 16, at 8; Letter from Danny Franklin, Partner, Bully
Pulpit Interactive, to Interested Parties (June 9, 2021) [hereinafter Letter from Danny Franklin],
https://www.aclu.org/other/poll-results-american-attitudes-toward-war-drugs

24

414

MORAL PANIC AND THE WAR ON DRUGS

Significantly, the impact of the War on Drugs has been deeply heterogeneous.
Those who bore the brunt of it were already marginalized. Traditionally
marginalized groups, such as African Americans, are disproportionately likelier be
targeted, arrested, and sentenced for drug-related offences. While African
Americans represent some 12 percent of the United States population, they
represent 62 percent of drug offenders in state prison systems.25 (Drug use rates are
very similar amongst African Americans and the rest of the population.)26 Persons
of color already make up 60 percent of the prison population – for all offences.27
Persons of color make up an even greater proportion of those convicted of charges
involving a mandatory minimum sentence. 28 For drug-related offences, a
mandatory minimum sentence is more likely to be sought, and post-sentencing
relief is less likely to be granted.29
Wealth and other factors which make individuals vulnerable to overlapping
forms of discrimination are intimately intertwined. African Americans own
significantly fewer assets than other racial groups.30 Their incomes are lower, and

[https://perma.cc/7XH8-K2BG]; cf. Stauffer, supra note 13 (discussing the experience of U.S.
states and foreign jurisdictions with decriminalization).
See Coyne & Hall, supra note 14, at 12 (which also notes that the War on Drug intensified
these gaps); see also Moore & Elkavitch, supra note 7, at 784 (“In 1996, Blacks constituted 62.6% of
drug offenders in state prisons. Nationwide, the rate of persons admitted to prison on drug
charges for Black men is 13 times that for White men, and in 10 states, the rates are 26 to 57 times
those for White men” [references omitted]); Jamie Fellner, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial
Disparities in the War on Drugs – Racially Disproportionate Incarceration of Drug Offenders, Human
Rights Watch (May 2000), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/Rcedrg00-04.htm#P289_
60230 [https://perma.cc/K8SU-VZRH]. For more recent statistics, see E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in
2016, U.S. Dep’t. of Just.: Bureau of Just. Stat. 1, 7 (Jan. 2018), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/
pub/pdf/p16.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FGU-CD2W].

25

26

See Moore & Elkavitch, supra note 7, at 783.

27

See id.; Carson, supra note 25, at 7.

See Betsy Pearl, Ending the War on Drugs: By the Numbers, Ctr for Am. Progress (June 27,
2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2018/06/27/452819/
ending-war-drugs-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/U55E-CC4T]; U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Quick
Facts: Mandatory Minimum Penalties (2017) [hereinafter U.S. Sent’g Comm’n],
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/
Quick_Facts_Mand_Mins_FY17.pdf [https://perma.cc/K544-FGNK].

28

29

See Pearl, supra note 28; U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, supra note 28.

See, e.g., Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, Disrupting the Racial Wealth Gap, 18
Contexts 16, 18 (2019) (finding that the average African-American family owns a tenth of the
wealth of the average White family); Lisa A. Keister, Race and Wealth Inequality: The Impact of Racial

30
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they are disproportionately less likely to see them grow.31 The War on Drugs has
contributed, and continues to contribute, to the marginalization of African
Americans and other groups that were already marginalized and overincarcerated.
And criminalization significantly contributes to a cycle of marginalization.32 Those
with a criminal record will find it almost impossible to gain employment, especially
in lower-paying industries. 33 Prof. Lisa Moore has noted that the impacts of
criminalization can be wider ranging:
The challenges that lead a person to prison – drug addition, alcoholism, untreated
mental illnesses, lack of employment opportunities – are not abated by incarceration;
they are often worsened. Former inmates may have lost family and social ties. . . . Zero
tolerance laws prohibit people with drug-related felonies from using government
assistance such as public housing and federal financial aid to attend college. However,
violent felons are not excluded from these programs.34

The next Part defines the concept of moral panic. The following Part draws
upon the history of the War on Drugs and the data regarding its disproportionate
impact on marginalized groups, as laid out in this Part, to argue that the War on
Drugs is best conceptualized as an instance of moral panic.
II.

MORAL PANIC

Over the past five decades, moral panic has emerged as a textured and nuanced
Differences in Asset Ownership on the Distribution of Household Wealth, 29 Soc. Sci. Rsch. 477, 478
(2000).
See, e.g., Randall Akee et al., Race Matters: Income Shares, Income Inequality, and Income Mobility
for All U.S. Races, 56 Demography 999, 1002 (2019).

31

See generally Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Nicholas Blomley & Céline Bellot, Red Zones
Criminal Law and the Territorial Governance of Marginalized People (Cambridge,
2020); Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed On (Not) Getting By in America (Picador,
2011).

32

See Moore & Elkavitch, supra note 7, at 784; Coyne & Hall, supra note 14, at 2. See generally
Patricia M. Harris & Kimberly S. Keller, Ex-Offenders Need Not Apply: The Criminal Background Check
in Hiring Decisions, 21 J. Contemp. Crim. Just. 6 (2005); Ehrenreich, supra note 32. This is
particularly problematic given the overrepresentation of criminalized and marginalized groups
in these lower-paying positions.

33

Moore & Elkavitch, supra note 7, at 784; see also Coyne & Hall, supra note 14, at 2
(“Approximately 50,000–60,000 students are denied financial aid every year due to past drug
convictions.”). These issues are likely to make the majority of Americans increasingly
uncomfortable. Indeed, 2020 marked an inflexion point in public opinion regarding the
significance of racial disparities in various aspects of American society, and the urgency to
address them. See generally Phil Lord, Black Lives Matter: On Challenging the Soul of Legal Education,
54 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 89 (2022).

34
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sociological concept. While it may have been (mis)used by politicians and others as
a rhetorical device, it is still rigorously used, applied, and debated in sociology and
other disciplines.35 The phrase was first coined in Stanley Cohen’s monograph Folk
Devils and Moral Panics.36 In the first chapter of his monograph, Cohen introduces
the concept as follows:
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat
to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical
fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops,
politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the
condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.
Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which
has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes
the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other
times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such
changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself.37

The phrase moral panic implies both a collective component in the reaction to an
actual or perceived threat, and the disproportionality and reactionary nature of the
reaction. Stuart Hall and others add to Cohen’s definition:
When the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of events is out of all
proportion to the actual threat offered, when ‘experts’, in the form of police chiefs, the
judiciary, politicians and editors perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear
to talk ‘with one voice’ of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions, when the media
representations universally stress ‘sudden and dramatic’ increases (in numbers involved
or events) and ‘novelty’, above and beyond that which a sober, realistic appraisal could

See David Garland, On the Concept of Moral Panic, 4 Crime, Media, Culture: Int’l. J. 9, 9
(2008).

35

See Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics 1 (MacGibbon and Kee, 1972). The
monograph has been republished and reprinted several times. The latest edition is Stanley
Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (Routledge, 2011) [hereinafter Cohen, Folk Devils and
Moral Panics (2011)]. Cohen subsequently further developed his analytical and theoretical
framework. See, e.g., Stanley Cohen, Visions of Social Control: Crime, Punishment and
Classification 170 (Wiley, 1991); Stanley Cohen, Whose Side Were We On? The Undeclared Politics of
Moral Panic Theory, 7 Crime, Media, Culture: Int’l. J. 237, 238 (2011).

36

Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (2011), supra note 36, at 1; see also David L. Altheide,
Moral Panic: From Sociological Concept to Public Discourse, 5 Crime, Media, Culture: Int’l J. 79, 80
(2009); Sheldon Ungar, Moral Panic Versus the Risk Society: The Implications of the Changing Sites of
Social Anxiety, 52 Brit. J. Soc. 271, 271 (2001); Amanda Rohloff & Sarah Wright, Moral Panic and
Social Theory: Beyond the Heuristic, 58 Current Soc. 403, 403 (2010).

37

417

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

20:2 (2022)

sustain, then we believe it is appropriate to speak of . . . a moral panic.38

These early accounts of moral panics emerged in the 1970s, yet they remain
highly influential to contemporary conceptualization. In more recent research,
moral panic has been helpfully reduced to the following constitutive factors: (i)
concern (anxiety – as a result of a real or perceived threat); (ii) hostility (vilification
of a group, labelled in research as “folk devils”); (iii) consensus (collective aspect of
the reaction); (iv) disproportionality (again, of the reaction); (v) volatility (moral
panics often emerge, propagate, and subside quickly);39 (vi) a moral dimension; and
(vii) the shared conviction that the deviant conduct is symptomatic.40
I must emphasize and draw out three aspects of moral panics, which will be of
particular assistance to my discussion of the War on Drugs. First, as noted by Cohen
and others, the (mass) media has played a key role in the emergence and
intensification of contemporary instances of moral panic.41 Likely as a result, the
media’s role has been noted in most theoretical frameworks. While the same social
phenomena can be observed in earlier societies,42 contemporary moral panics are
intricately tied to the rise of the mass media, incentivized to draw and monetize
attention,43 and the erosion of historical barriers to access to information.44
Second, as noted, moral panics involve the stigmatization of a particular
group.45 Significantly, this group is often already marginalized: the “folk devils,” or
Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order 20
(Red Globe Press, 2nd ed. 2013) (emphasis in original).

38

On the first five elements, see Erich Goode & Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The
Social Construction of Deviance 37–43 (Wiley, 2nd ed., 2008). See also Garland, supra note
35, at 10–11; Rohloff & Wright, supra note 37, at 416; Ungar, supra note 37, at 275.

39

40

On the latter two elements, see Garland, supra note 35, at 11.

See generally Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (2011), supra note 36; Hall et al., supra
note 38; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39; Garland, supra note 35; Ungar, supra note 37;
Altheide, supra note 37.

41

See, e.g., Manderson, supra note 13, at 41; Issaac Ariail Reed, Deep Culture in Action:
Resignification, Synecdoche, and Metanarrative in the Moral Panic of the Salem Witch Trials, 44 Theory &
Soc’y 65, 78 (2015). The sources discuss moral panic regarding witches and witchcraft.

42

See generally Kenneth R. Ahern & Denis Sosyura, Rumor Has It: Sensationalism in Financial
Media, 28 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2050 (2015); Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin, Government Control of
the Media, 118 J. Pub. Econ. 163 (2014).

43

See Cass R. Sunstein, Liars: Falsehoods and Free Speech in an Age of Deception
(Oxford, 2021). See generally Narcyz Roztocki, The Role of Information and Communication Technologies
in Socioeconomic Development: Towards a Multi-Dimensional Framework, 25 Info. Tech. Dev. 171
(2019).

44

45

See generally Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39; Garland, supra note 35, at 10–11.
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scapegoats, tend to be those who are already singled out – perhaps because they are
different.46 This point is further discussed in the next Part.
Third, contemporary moral panics often involve the criminal law. The behavior
labelled as deviant, which society seeks to eradicate, is often criminalized.47 This is
likely a result both of the criminal law’s unique characteristics and its intrinsic
familiarity with the “moral” aspect of moral panics.
Of course, the
disproportionality of reactions in a moral panic makes the criminal law a uniquely
fit tool. 48 With its stark punishments and more systematic application, it is our
strongest legal tool. 49 More importantly, the criminal law has long served noninstrumental functions, which are not legitimized beyond the criminal law.
Behavior is at times criminalized because it is perceived to be wrong: this
denunciation of the immorality of the behavior is in itself valued, regardless of
whether criminalization serves more instrumental outcomes like deterrence.50 This
symbolic aspect of law, often labelled denunciation, is found in criminal codes and
statutes – most predominantly in sentencing provisions.51 It is a way for a society

See, e.g., Garland, supra note 35, at 14 (not directly stating as much but listing as examples of
folk devils “welfare claimants, single mothers, illegal immigrants, HIV sufferers, gay men”);
Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (2011), supra note 36, at xxi (also indirectly supporting
the claim and listing as folk devils “welfare cheats” and “unmarried mothers”); Ungar, supra note
37, at 283–84; see also infra Part III.

46

See, e.g., Manderson, Possessed, supra note 13, at 43; Reed, supra note 42, at 69; Robert Leckey,
‘Repugnant’: Homosexuality and Criminal Family Law, 70 U. Toronto L.J. 225, 225–26 (2020)
(referring to fear and anxiety – without a mention of moral panics – in the criminalization of
homosexuality); Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (2011), supra note 36, at 1; Altheide, supra
note 37, at 79.

47

48

On disproportionality, see generally Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39.

See Lord, supra note 13, at 7. The application of the criminal law can lead to the loss of one’s
fundamental freedom. Its application is more systematic because it is a public law tool. The
application of the criminal law is not as subject to cost and other constraints inherent to private
law rights and remedies. One might also speculate that incarceration is uniquely relevant to
protecting society from the real or perceived threat of a particular group, as it isolates offenders
from society.

49

See generally Lord, supra note 13; Richard Dubé & Sébastien Labonté, La dénonciation, la
rétribution et la dissuasion : repenser trois obstacles à l’évolution du droit criminel moderne, 57 Cahiers de
Droit 685 (2016); Bill Wringe, Rethinking Expressive Theories of Punishment: Why Denunciation is a
Better Bet than Communication or Pure Expression, 174 Phil. Stud. 681 (2016); Lisa L. Sample et al.,
Sex Offender Community Notification Laws: Are Their Effects Symbolic or Instrumental in Nature?, 22
Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 27 (2011).

50

See Lord, supra note 13, at 6–7 (noting that the Canada’s Criminal Code (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46)
includes denunciation as a factor in sentencing and that “[a]lthough many have criticised the

51

419

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

20:2 (2022)

to “communicate” the significance of deviant behavior, as well as the ways in which
it infringes upon key values or convictions shared by community members52 – what
I have termed “[at times] repugnant situations which shock the public conscience.”53
Implicit in such criminalization is a shared, collective anxiety (as invoked in the
above definition of a moral panic)54: the behavior we criminalize is a threat, a threat
to these values and convictions and thereby to the shared identity they define.55
III. FROM WITCHES TO SUPERPREDATORS

This Part draws upon the factual background and theoretical framework laid
out in the previous Parts to argue that the War on Drugs is an instance of moral
panic. Its methodology is eclectic because moral panics are not objects of rational,
deliberate human endeavor. They are instead products of deep, dark, inherent
human emotions: fear, hate, and anxiety.56 As objects of human psychology, they
are rhetorical and constitutive events. While they are sparked by fear and anxiety,
they propagate and intensify through rhetoric. This rhetoric is in turn
(re)constitutive. The canonical authors note the “volatility” of moral panics: they
emerge, propagate, and subside quickly.57 They quickly become collective events, as
fear spreads within a community. Fear spreads through the rhetoric of those who
express it and vilify the “folk devils” who are deemed dangerous or responsible.58 As
noted, the mass media has played a key role in the development of contemporary
moral panics: 59 it is the metaphorical megaphone to this rhetoric. James Boyd

relevance of denunciation in sentencing, its importance does not seem to have waned over time.
Many recent amendments to the Criminal Code further entrench its importance when certain
crimes have been committed. This is true regarding offenses against children, peace officers and
other justice system participants.” [references omitted]); see also Michael S. Moore, Placing
Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law 84 (Oxford, 2010).
52

Dubé & Labonté, supra note 50, at 691–92.

53

Lord, supra note 13, at 8.

54

See generally Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39.

55

See generally Lord, supra note 13.

56

See generally Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39; Garland, supra note 35, at 10–11.

57

See Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39, at 41; Garland, supra note 35, at 10–11.

58

See generally Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39; Garland, supra note 35, at 10–11.

See Sunstein, supra note 44. See generally Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (2011),
supra note 36; Hall et al., supra note 38; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39; Garland, supra
note 35.
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White spoke of the “law as rhetoric.”60 The law, he argued, is best understood as “a
branch of rhetoric.” 61 It formed and reshaped through rhetoric: we argue that
certain statues do or do not apply, should or should not apply, and we engage in
fundamental debates about what the law should or should not be, about how it
ought to be changed. 62 Rhetoric is therefore constitutive of the law. More
importantly, this process presupposes a shared language and an audience.63 Both
are indicative of a community (albeit a fluid one), which the law shapes.64 In that
sense, rhetoric on the War on Drugs is not merely a lens into the War on Drugs, as
it is not “exogenous.”65 It is the War on Drugs. Rhetoric spreads and redefines the
fear and anxiety that drive moral panics. It legitimates – and therefore constitutes
– the legislative enactments which have defined the War on Drugs. 66 And these
legislative enactments are, in turn, constitutive. They fuel the underlying moral
panic and define a shared identity. As noted in the previous Part, criminalizing
certain behavior denounces it (a communicative act) and consolidates a shared
identity rejecting it.67
In keeping with the unique significance of rhetoric to the War on Drugs (and
moral panics more broadly), I draw almost equally upon the statistics I highlighted
above and a speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton. This speech, where Clinton
introduces the term “superpredators,” was significant both in the War on Drugs and
in the subsequent wholesale shift in public opinion regarding the
overcriminalization of marginalized groups.68
James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 684, 684 (1985).

60

61

See id. at 684.

62

See id. at 688–91.

63

See id. at 690–92.

64

See id.

65

See id. at 698. By lens, I essentially mean an instructive and microcosmic example.

See, e.g., Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, supra note 10; AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986, supra note 11; Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1796 (discussed infra).

66

67

See supra Part II. See generally Lord, supra note 13.

See, e.g., Allison Grave, Did Hillary Clinton Call African-American Youth ‘Superpredators?’,
PolitiFact (Aug. 28, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2016/aug/28/reince-priebus/
did-hillary-clinton-call-african-american-youth-su/ [https://perma.cc/72XH-NMMC];
Reena Flores, Bernie Sanders Slams Clinton’s “Racist” 1996 Super Predators Comment, CBS News (Apr.
14, 2016, 10:56 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bernie-sanders-slams-clintons-racist-1996super-predators-comment/ [https://perma.cc/4LVQ-YFVL]; Jessie Hellmann, Trump: ‘How Quickly
People Forget’ Clinton ‘Superpredator’ Remark, The Hill (Aug. 26, 2016, 2:13 PM), https://thehill.com/

68

421

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

20:2 (2022)

On January 25, 1996, Hillary Rodham Clinton, then First Lady of the United
States, was campaigning for her husband’s re-election in Keene, New Hampshire.69
Over her life and career, Clinton has sought to defend children’s rights.70 She has
highlighted this experience throughout her political career, most notably during
election campaigns.71 It is unsurprising, then, that she chose to focus on children
on that January afternoon. Her speech began with her thoughts on the challenge to
“cherish our children and strengthen the American family.” 72 She invoked the
importance of ensuring that each child “grows up with two parents” (later defined
as parents of opposite sexes) in a “stable, dependable home.”73 Quickly, though, she
shifted attention to the risks facing American children. “We also have to protect our
children,” she said, referring to “little children as potential consumers for
cigarettes,” “teen pregnancy,” and “out-of-wedlock births.” 74 The challenges, she
argued, come “at them from every direction.” 75 Parents are “the first line of
defense.”76 Later in the speech, she addressed the need to “take back our street from
blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/293477-trump-how-quickly-people-forget-clinton-superpredator [https://perma.cc/7V53-2K3U]. On the shift in public opinion, see Pew Charitable
Trs., supra note 16, at 8; Letter from Danny Franklin, supra note 24.
See First Lady Hillary Clinton, Campaign Speech at Keene State College, C-SPAN (Jan. 25,
1996), https://www.c-span.org/video/?69606-1/hillary-clinton-campaign-speech
[https://perma.cc/696C-XJNW].

69

See, e.g., The Office of Hillary Rodham Clinton, About Hillary,
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/CNL9-JW3J] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021)
(“Her mother’s experience inspired Hillary to fight for the needs of children everywhere. . . . After
law school, Hillary didn’t join a big law firm in Washington or New York. Instead, she went to
work for the Children’s Defense Fund, going door-to-door in New Bedford, Massachusetts,
gathering stories about the lack of schooling for children with disabilities. These testimonials
contributed to the passage of historic legislation that required the state to provide quality
education for students with disabilities. This commitment to public service and fighting for
others—especially children and families—has stayed with her throughout her life. … She [later]
worked with Republicans and Democrats to help create the successful Children’s Health
Insurance Program, which provides health coverage to more than 8 million children and has
helped cut the uninsured rate for children in half.”).

70

See, e.g., id.; About, Hillary for America (Nov. 8, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/
20161108201232/https://www.hillaryclinton.com/about/hillary/ [https://perma.cc/8K6G-3VGY]
(highlighting this experience during the 2016 United States presidential election).

71

72

See First Lady Hillary Clinton, Campaign Speech at Keene State College, supra note 69.

73

See id.

74

See id.

75

See id.

76

See id.
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crime, gangs, and drugs.”77 She spoke favorably of the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 78 which her husband championed as President,
noting:
We need to take these people on. They are often connected to big drug cartels. They are
not just gangs of kids anymore. They are often the kinds of kids that are called
superpredators. No conscience. No empathy. We can talk about why they ended up
that way but first we have to bring them to heel.79

Clinton’s words are interesting both substantively and rhetorically. Her
position on drugs is first indicative of the social and political consensus which
underlaid the War on Drugs (one of the key characteristics of moral panics).80 The
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 199481 she refers to finds its
genesis in Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign policy proposals. 82 It was sponsored by
(among others) then-Senator Joe Biden, 83 who, as noted above, also criticized
George H. W. Bush for not dedicating sufficient resources to the War on Drugs.84
In other words, the War on Drugs unified – and was shaped by – a former American
President, a 2016 presidential candidate, and the current American President (all
members of the Democratic Party). As noted, it was a product of several successive
presidential administrations, spanning the political spectrum.85 An overwhelming
majority of Americans – over 80% – quickly shared the concern and, more
importantly, supported the increasingly severe criminalization of a range of drug-

77

See id.

78

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, supra note 66.

See First Lady Hillary Clinton, Campaign Speech at Keene State College, supra note 69.
Interestingly, another first lady, Nancy Reagan, was significantly involved in the War on Drugs.
See Mrs. Reagan's Crusade, The Ronald Reagan Presidential Libr. & Found. (Apr. 27, 2006),
https://web.archive.org/web/20060427235046/http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/nancy/
just_say_no.asp [https://perma.cc/7AXT-UJCT].

79

80

See generally Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39; Garland, supra note 35, at 10–11.

81

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, supra note 64.

See, e.g., Governor Bill Clinton, Putting People First: A National Economic Strategy for America
(June 21, 1992), https://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/speeches/clinton.dir/
c20.txt [https://perma.cc/XTU5-P7YV].

82

See Michael Kranish, Joe Biden Let Police Groups Write His Crime Bill. Now, His Agenda Has
Changed., Wash. Post (June 8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/joe-biden-letpolice-groups-write-his-crime-bill-now-his-agenda-has-changed/2020/06/08/82ab969e-a43411ea-8681-7d471bf20207_story.html [https://perma.cc/GT5N-KU5W].

83

84

See Farber, supra note 8.

85

See id.
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related conduct, including drug possession.86
Rhetorically, Clinton’s speech concisely encapsulates the salient characteristics
of moral panics described in the previous Part. First, her words convey, and instill,
fear.87 Our kids are in grave danger. We need to “take back our streets” from these
“superpredators.”88 There is also a sense of urgency.89 Those who want to corrupt
and harm our kids “[come] at them from every direction.”90 The significance and
urgency of these threats are highlighted by the reference to children – symbols of
innocence and vulnerability often used in rhetorical appeals.91 The personalization
of the victim makes us empathetic to prospective victims and, as a result, more
afraid of the threat. As a result of cognitive biases, we respond to anecdotal evidence
far more than to (more relevant) statistical evidence. 92 Clinton’s rhetoric is
analogous to that of other politicians throughout the War on Drugs – whose
labelling as a war itself instills fear and urgency. As noted above, President Nixon
launched the offensive by labelling drugs “public enemy number one.”93 He added:
“In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out
offensive. . . . This will be a worldwide offensive. . . . It will be government-wide . . .
and it will be nationwide.”94 Similarly, in criticizing then-President George H. W.
Bush, Joe Biden invoked the same metaphor, stating: “We need another D-Day.
Instead, you’re giving us another Vietnam: a limited war, fought on the cheap,
financed on the sly, with no clear objectives, and ultimately destined for stalemate
See id. (noting that over 80 percent of Americans agreed that even possession of lower-level
drugs should be criminalized).

86

87

See generally Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39; Garland, supra note 35, at 10–11.

88

See First Lady Hillary Clinton, Campaign Speech at Keene State College, supra note 69.

89

See generally Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39; Garland, supra note 35, at 10–11.

90

See First Lady Hillary Clinton, Campaign Speech at Keene State College, supra note 69.

See Farber, supra note 8 (arguing that widespread support for the criminalization of drug
possession was sparked by the increasing popularity of drugs with younger Americans – and the
associated anxiety of older Americans). See generally Jenny Kitzinger, Who Are You Kidding?
Children, Power, and the Struggle Against Sexual Abuse, in Constructing and Reconstructing
Childhood 165 (Allison James & Alan Prout eds., 2015); Karen Brooks, Consuming Innocence:
Popular Culture and Our Children (Queensland, 2008).

91

See generally Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments, 44 Acta Psych. 211
(1980); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 Psych. Rev. 237 (1973);
Daniel Bergan & Heysung Lee, Media Credibility and the Base Rate Fallacy, 63 J. Broad. & Elec.
Media 195 (2019). This is known as the base-rate fallacy. When presented with relevant statistical
data, individuals will often ignore it if provided with individuating information of a specific case.

92

93

See Farber, supra note 8.

94

See id.
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and human tragedy.”95
Prof. Desmond Manderson has extensively analyzed the criminalization of
drug possession.96 He notes that criminalizing possession of a substance implies a
fear of it.97 We are criminalizing potential harm before it materializes, outlawing
“the fact of one’s proximity to an object.”98 He notes the longstanding prohibition
of drug use, contrasted to the regulation of alcohol use.99 He also notes that most
drugs are not inherently dangerous.100 As a result, he argues, our fear relates to the
drug user. Focusing on opium, he argues that the metonymical drug user was
Chinese and that “settler societies that led the rush to prohibition had large and
poorly assimilated Chinese minorities.” 101 I will further describe this metaphor
below in arguing that the War on Drugs is also racially charged.
Fear, anxiety, and a sense of urgency are all related to the disproportionality
that defines moral panics.102 We overreact precisely because we are afraid and feel
a sense of urgency. And we persist when faced with failure for the same reasons. As
noted, the War on Drugs united politicians across the political spectrum and over
several decades, as well a significant majority of the American public. 103 All

See id. Interestingly, the same metaphor has recently been used regarding the COVID-19
pandemic. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley and Luis Ferré-Sadurní, With State in Crisis, Cuomo Outlines
Plan to ‘Win the Covid War’, N.Y. Times (Jan. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/
nyregion/cuomo-state-coronavirus-budget.html [https://perma.cc/HA4C-H3B4]
(quoting former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo).

95

See Manderson, Possessed, supra note 13; Desmond Manderson, Like Men Possessed: What are
Illicit Drug Laws Really For?, Conversation (Nov. 2, 2014, 2:21 PM) [hereinafter Manderson, Like
Men Possessed], https://theconversation.com/like-men-possessed-what-are-illicit-drug-lawsreally-for-31739 [https://perma.cc/WD4C-FJFX]; Desmond Manderson, Symbolism and Racism in
Drug History Policy, 18 Drug & Alcohol Rev. 179 (1999) [hereinafter Manderson, Symbolism and
Racism]; Desmond Manderson, Metamorphoses: Clashing Symbols in the Social Construction of Drugs,
25 J. Drug Issues 799 (1995) [hereinafter Manderson, Metamorphoses]; Desmond Manderson,
From Mr. Sin to Mr. Big: A History of Australian Drug Laws (Oxford, 1994) [hereinafter
Manderson, Mr. Sin to Mr. Big].

96

97

See Manderson, Possessed, supra note 13, at 37.

98

See id. at 36–37.

99

See id. at 37–38.

100

See id. at 37.

See id.; see also Manderson, Mr. Sin to Mr. Big, supra note 96; Manderson, Symbolism and
Racism, supra note 96; Manderson, Metamorphoses, supra note 96.

101

102

See generally Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39; Garland, supra note 35, at 10–11.

See Farber, supra note 8; see also Michael Vitiello, The War on Drugs: Moral Panic and Excessive
Sentences, 69 Clev. St. L. Rev. 441 (2021) (arguing that the Supreme Court of the United States
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persisted in spite of the fact that the War on Drugs has failed to affect any drugrelated outcome – whether drug consumption, trafficking, or addiction.104
Hillary Clinton’s words also exemplify the “othering” that defines moral
panics. 105 Her speech is an especially useful example because both groups are
children: on the one hand, there are “our children,” the “little children [who are]
potential consumers for cigarettes”; on the other, there are the “kids” (notice the
word choice), the “superpredators” who have neither “conscience” nor “empathy.”106
There is no halfway point.107 There are those who are innocent and vulnerable. And
those who lost all humanity, to such an extent that they are no longer truly children.
This is as disturbing as it is unsurprising. The dehumanization of the “other” is
an inherently human exercise. It is also one that is often channeled through the
criminal law.108 As noted, the criminal law allows us to draw lines between what we
accept and what we do not accept. It often serves to denounce behavior we find
abhorrent.109 The criminals are the “other.” The very labelling we use indicates as
much. We do not speak of persons who commit crimes or, more helpfully, of
persons with children and futures who encountered significant barriers at all stages
of their lives and eventually committed a crime.110 Instead, we speak of criminals.
upheld excessive sentences because it agreed with the societal consensus that drugs had become
a significant national problem).
See Stauffer, supra note 13; Pew Charitable Trs., supra note 16; Nat’l Research Council,
supra note 20.

104

See generally Goode & Ben-Yehuda, supra note 39; Garland, supra note 35, at 10–11. The
authors cited in Part II alternatively write of “folk devils” and scapegoats. Cf. Manderson,
Metamorphoses, supra note 96 (discussing how drug use results in a rejection from the mainstream
community and acceptance into a community of drug users).

105

106

See First Lady Hillary Clinton, Campaign Speech at Keene State College, supra note 69.

See Manderson, Possessed, supra note 13, at 52 (“So too one would not expect the witch-hunters
of the sixteenth century to have countenanced any tolerance of witches. It was the health of their
soul and not their body that concerned the inquisitors, and only a complete elimination of
witchcraft could have counted as successful. It would not have made sense to argue that there was
a continuum between witchcraft and other practices, because it was precisely the distinction that
was most important and that dramatized the impossibility of any kind of relativism or
agnosticism where the Devil was concerned.”).

107

See, e.g., id.; Reed, supra note 42, at 69; Leckey, supra note 47; Cohen, Folk Devils and
Moral Panics (2011), supra note 36; Altheide, supra note 37.

108

See, e.g., Lord, supra note 13; Dubé & Labonté, supra note 50; Wringe, supra note 50; Sample,
Evans & Anderson, supra note 50. Denunciation is undoubtedly related to White’s conception of
the law as rhetoric. See White, supra note 60.

109

On the relationship between socioeconomic status (social determinants) and criminality, see,
e.g., Mikko Aaltonen et al., Social Determinants of Crime in a Welfare State: Do They Still Matter?, 54
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In a powerful rhetorical and constitutive exercise, 111 the individual’s identity is
subsumed into the crime.
This exercise arguably transcends “othering,” though. As noted, criminalizing
certain behavior is as much about the other as it is about us. In (mis)defining the
other, we reassure ourselves that we are fundamentally different. Speaking of the
aforementioned “persons with children and futures who encountered significant
barriers at all stages of their lives and eventually committed a crime” would risk
eliciting empathy and, more importantly, highlighting what we have in common
with the criminal. Worse yet, it risks blurring the line, unsettling our conviction
that we would have made different choices in the same circumstances because we
are fundamentally different. Prof. Manderson has extensively written of the
parallels between witchcraft and drugs.112 Let me draw out the analogy and suggest
that “othering” is analogous to exorcism. It is about getting the evil out of ourselves.
Because it is there to start with. There is a bit of evil in each of us, and we are a few
choices or challenges away from becoming criminals. That is not something we can
easily live with. By labelling and punishing the criminal, often through the
legitimating power of the law, we deny that aspect of our identity. We draw
distinctions and ignore shared characteristics. By “othering” the other, we un-other
ourselves.
This aspect of the human identity is as dark as it is inherent. It manifests itself
throughout human history and, as the many contemporary instances of moral panic
suggest, with the same prevalence in developed societies. If we can ever seek to do
better, we must recognize it first.
A yet darker aspect of this “othering” is that it seems to almost invariably
marginalize the already marginalized. 113 It might be easier to target as “others”
those who are different from us. More importantly, the dispossessed often lack the
voice and ability 114 to defend themselves. I have previously written regarding
Quebec’s secularism law, Bill 21. Although Bill 21 is not a criminal law, I argue that
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it is essentially denunciatory. 115 Bill 21 prevents public servants in positions of
authority from wearing religious “symbols.” 116 The definition of such public
servants is very broad, for instance encompassing teachers. 117 While others have
argued that it denotes an anxiety regarding Muslims,118 I argue that Bill 21 is a way
for Quebec to break free from an oppressive legacy of the confluence of church and
state – shaped by the influence of the Catholic Church.119 Drawing upon a similar
theoretical framework, I argue that Bill 21 is really underlain by a shared anxiety
regarding a multiculturalism pushed too far, driven by the outsize influence of a
particular religious group.120 As in the criminal law, denunciation has a cost. I offer
the analogy of sentencing. Where denunciation is an objective in sentencing, it
leads to a more significant sentence for the offender – one that has no instrumental
value and may even often have counterproductive consequences (such as increasing
recidivism).121 With Bill 21, these consequences are borne by Muslim women and
other minority groups. To the extent that their religious “symbols” are an essential
part of their faith, 122 Bill 21 may prevent them from seeking or maintaining
employment in the public service.123 The cost of denunciation is not merely that we
abandon more instrumental goals; it is often that we impact marginalized groups
such as Muslim women.
Similarly, Prof. Robert Leckey has analyzed the decriminalization of
homosexuality in Canada.124 Needless to say, sexual relations between consenting
adults are not an intrinsically dangerous activity (as is other criminalized conduct).
We can therefore understand that criminalizing sodomy was directed at
denouncing and eradicating homosexual relations, an activity which society
115
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abhorred. Leckey notes that legislators were careful to reiterate their opposition to
homosexual relations when homosexuality was decriminalized: they were careful to
prevent the framing of decriminalization as public assent of condonation. He notes:
The Parliament of Canada partially decriminalized homosexual conduct in 1969.
Keeping buggery and gross indecency as offences, the reform carved an exception for
consensual acts committed in private by husband and wife or by two persons twentyone years of age or older. . . . As rapidly becomes plain, the reform’s opponents wore
their homophobia on their sleeves. They expressed a sense of insecurity, anxiety, and
even panic: Canadian society was under threat; heterosexuality and the family were
fragile. Strikingly, though, even the leading reformers insisted that homosexuality
would remain illegal, laboriously affirming their disgust for it.125

Again, the criminalization of certain conduct advanced no instrumental goal. Its
cost was born by persons of differing sexual orientations, who were similarly
already marginalized.
I mentioned above that Clinton’s speech was “significant both in the War on
Drugs and in the subsequent wholesale shift in public opinion regarding the
overcriminalization of marginalized groups.” The subsequent backlash regards her
use of the term “superpredators.” However, critics have highlighted the racial
undertones to her use of the word (race is not directly mentioned in her speech).
They have conflated the two, essentially arguing that she called African American
youth superpredators.126 This is less surprising given the statistics cited in Part I.
The War on Drugs has disproportionally targeted African Americans (and, to a
lesser extent, other marginalized groups) at all stages of criminalization: stops,
arrests, and sentencing.127 These racial disparities have contributed to the already
problematic overincarceration and marginalization of marginalized groups.128
To state that African Americans and other marginalized groups were
disproportionately affected by the War on Drugs is not to say that they are the “folk
devils” or “others” within the moral panic framework. 129 Indeed, this
disproportionate impact could be due to broader racism in society. However, many
See id. at 225–26. The quotation also notes anxiety, another characteristic of moral panics,
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authors have specifically suggested that racism more broadly imbues the War on
Drugs.130 The backlash regarding Clinton’s words certainly suggests some degree of
intentionality. Recall Prof. Manderson’s above hypothesis that outlawing opium
was driven by racial animus in “settler societies that . . . had large and poorly
assimilated Chinese minorities.”131 Manderson notes that drugs are not generally
feared in themselves, that we instead fear the drug user.132 We can hypothesize that
the same was true of African Americans. The superpredators Clinton refers to could
be African American men seeking to convince vulnerable White children to consume
drugs. The disproportionate impact of the War on Drugs would then directly result
from the conviction of actors tasked with the enforcement of drug laws that African
Americans are indeed the problem. This hypothesis is supported by coverage and
analysis of the opioid crisis. 133 (As mentioned the media is often a key actor in
contemporary moral panics.)134 An extensive analysis of news sources has shown
that Black victims of the crisis have been depicted as engaging in criminalized
conduct, while White victims have been depicted as sick, blameless, and
sympathetic victims.135 On the latter, the authors of the study note:
Some might argue that such stories have the potential to de-mystify addiction across
the board, to prove that ‘‘anyone can become an addict,’’ showing addiction to be a
blameless disorder ‘‘that does not discriminate.’’ Looking at the differences in media
coverage of opioid addiction by race, however, we argue that these white opioid images
are resetting the terms of drugs and race in popular culture in ways that insidiously
further distinguish white from black (and brown) suffering, white from black
culpability, and white from black deservingness. Arising in tandem with, rather than in
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tension with, the official ‘‘War on Drugs’’ and its mass incarceration of blacks and
Latinos, white opioid images have helped to carve out a separate space for white opioid
use in the popular American imagination, one that leads to racially stratified
therapeutic intervention and works to further insulate white communities from black
and brown drug threats, leaving intact law enforcement crackdowns on black and
brown urban residents in the name of public safety.136

The authors further note that Black victims are less likely to be offered
“addiction treatment, counseling or tools for prevention of overdose and injection
related infections.”137
CONCLUSION

This Article has analyzed the War on Drugs as a social phenomenon. It argued
that such an analysis, which rejects the assumption that collective, institutionalized
behavior is generally rational, can help us understand key aspects of why we
continue to marginalize disadvantaged individuals. If the War on Drugs is a war
and wars are won or lost, there is no question we lost. Whatever drug-related evil it
sought to eradicate, the data clearly shows that “drugs won.” Along the way, we
nonetheless persisted – and largely still do. To state that we lost is unhelpful and
insufficient. If the War on Drugs never worked, more salient questions are to be
asked about why we fought it. This Article has posited that the War on Drugs is not
about drugs, crime, or addiction: it is about us. It is about why we cede to fear,
anxiety, and irrationality. It is about why we stigmatize and hurt the most
vulnerable. Like other irrational and counterproductive policies, the War on Drugs
is not an anomaly. It bears close resemblance to other wars we fought (and fight)
against the disempowered: witches, gays, Muslims, and others.
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